Philosophies of Funding  by O'Malley, Maureen A. et al.
Leading Edge
CommentaryPhilosophies of Funding
Maureen A. O’Malley,1,* Kevin C. Elliott,2 Chris Haufe,3 and Richard M. Burian4,*
1Egenis, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4PJ, UK
2Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA
3Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA
4Department of Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA
*Correspondence: m.a.o’malley@exeter.ac.uk (M.A.O.), rmburian@vt.edu (R.M.B.)
DOI 10.1016/j.cell.2009.08.008
Successful scientific practice encompasses broader and more varied modes of investigation than 
can be captured by focusing on hypothesis-driven research. We examine the emphases that major 
US and UK funding agencies place on particular modes of research practice and suggest that 
funding agency guidelines should be informed by a more dynamic and multidimensional account 
of scientific practice.Philosophy is often regarded as abstract 
and irrelevant to practical concerns. Yet, 
when it comes to decisions about fund-
ing science, philosophical conceptions 
of good scientific methodology have 
major implications for research policy. A 
number of scientists and philosophers 
have argued that the best science is 
hypothesis driven and that science’s 
pivotal activity is to test hypotheses. 
From this perspective, descriptive, 
exploratory, and inductive methodolo-
gies, although sometimes necessary, 
are fundamentally preparatory. They are 
seen as valuable primarily to the extent 
that they fuel hypothesis-driven science. 
Despite this common view, a great deal 
of evidence indicates that it may be mis-
leading. Examples from physics, chem-
istry, and biology suggest that accounts 
of scientific activity should involve not 
only the proposal and testing of hypoth-
eses, but also the exploration of phe-
nomena, the development of technol-
ogy and techniques, and the generation 
of questions that can be addressed with 
inductive, model-building approaches 
(Glass and Hall, 2008; Kell and Oliver, 
2004; Caldin, 2002).
This wider viewpoint sees the pri-
mary output of science as its ability to 
intervene in and understand the natural 
world. Producing and testing hypoth-
eses are important but insufficient 
strategies for achieving these aims. We 
maintain that an adequate theoretical 
account of how science works will need 
to subordinate the generation and test-
ing of hypotheses to a far more inclu-
sive range of practices, and that one of the most crucial arenas in which this 
widening of perspective must occur is 
in the funding of science. Although we 
believe that inspiration, effort, commu-
nity structure, and intellectual rewards 
are of deep importance to scientific 
progress, from a practical viewpoint in 
today’s research environment, almost 
all scientific inquiry requires official 
funding of some sort. Because funding 
agencies use philosophical concep-
tions of good scientific methodology 
to guide funding decisions, philosophy 
affects the progress of science. It is 
therefore important that funding phi-
losophies reflect the complete body 
of strategies used to achieve scientific 
ends.
Here, we consider how our claims 
about the nature of scientific prac-
tice relate—and should relate—to 
policy statements about the practice 
of research and to funding agency 
guidelines for grant applications. To 
do this, we focus on statements from 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
and the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) in the US and the Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences Research Council 
(BBSRC) in the UK. We examine how 
these statements depict both hypo-
thesis-driven and more exploratory, 
question-driven, or technology-oriented 
modes of investigation. We conclude 
that developing a more complete repre-
sentation of the iterative, interdisciplin-
ary, and multidimensional relationships 
between various modes of scientific 
investigation could improve funding 
agency guidelines.Cell 13A Broad Account of Scientific 
Practice
It is standard for scientists, philoso-
phers, and other commentators on sci-
entific practice to claim that hypothesis 
testing lies at the very heart of scientific 
practice and that it is, in fact, the singular 
activity that demarcates it from nonsci-
entific activities (Popper, 1963). From a 
historical point of view, observers of sci-
ence know this is problematic. The con-
cept of the hypothesis and the popularity 
of hypothesis-driven modes of research 
have been in flux throughout the history 
of science (Laudan, 1981). The familiar 
representation of science as hypoth-
esis driven is typically based on situa-
tions in which very specific questions 
can be addressed within tightly bounded 
spheres of inquiry. Because such testing 
is upheld as an idealization of scientific 
practice, broader inquiries may often be 
framed post-hoc as narrower hypothesis 
testing (Glass, 2006). Other modes of 
practice, however, are at least as preva-
lent in less artificially narrowed contexts 
of inquiry. They frequently include differ-
ent combinations of technology devel-
opment, question-driven inquiry, and 
exploration of phenomena.
The early development of the micro-
scope, for example, revealed an invisible 
world that was then studied extensively in 
ways that led to entirely new understand-
ings of life and of roles for technology in 
scientific investigation (Wilson, 1995). 
Hypothesis testing played only a minor 
role in this revolution, which involved 
exploratory investigation of regularities 
among microscopic phenomena. Again, 8, August 21, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc. 611
general questions and the exploration 
of new technologies, rather than strict 
hypotheses, have propelled the develop-
ment of chemistry throughout its history 
(Caldin, 2002). In biology, despite the 
efforts of some commentators to recon-
struct all of Charles Darwin’s work as 
hypothesis testing (Ayala, 2009), it is clear 
that Darwin spent over two decades iden-
tifying regularities in several biological 
domains and codifying the phenomena to 
be explained in the Origin (Hodge, 1983). 
Similarly, in contemporary molecular biol-
ogy, the accumulation of high-throughput 
data and technology-driven develop-
ments point to the importance of a diver-
sity of non-hypothesis-driven practices 
(e.g., Brent, 2000; Aebersold et al., 2000; 
Franklin, 2005).
This broader range of practices involves 
open-ended and nonlinear approaches 
to specified—but sometimes vague and 
open—questions, problems, and ranges 
of phenomena. Inquiries tend to ramify as 
successive investigations produce par-
tial answers that modify the original aim 
of inquiry, tighten its focus, and give rise 
to additional lines of research. Although 
such practices are broadly exploratory in 
nature, without pre-ordained endpoints, 
they are not necessarily preliminary 
or unfocused. Question-driven inquiry 
is often highly rigorous, and it occurs 
throughout many stages of investigation, 
often yielding an expansion of the domain 
of inquiry (Glass, 2006). Exploratory work 
frequently involves systematic variation 
of precisely defined parameters. It com-
monly focuses on ascertaining regulari-
ties or on individuating and characterizing 
previously unknown or neglected entities 
and processes (Steinle, 1997; Franklin, 
2005). Technology-oriented modes of 
investigation encompass the develop-
ment of entirely new instruments and 
techniques, the modification or applica-
tion of old ones in new contexts, and the 
transformation of biological phenomena 
into new technologies. Frequently, these 
modes of scientific practice combine with 
the reconfiguration or replacement of 
conceptual frameworks. The discoveries 
that microRNAs contribute to eukaryotic 
gene regulation and that proteorhodop-
sin is present in marine bacteria serve as 
illuminating examples of such conceptual 
shifts and of how various modes of prac-
tice work in combination over time.612 Cell 138, August 21, 2009 ©2009 ElsevieUnlike hypothesis-driven science, 
these broader practices are often not 
discipline bound, due to their inherent 
tendencies to step outside the boundar-
ies of current technologies, theories, and 
community alliances. But despite the 
major differences between hypothesis-
driven and broader modes of investiga-
tion, they are not dichotomous or mutu-
ally exclusive categories of practice. 
Hypothesis testing can be conceived of 
as specific and refined questioning that 
works best in appropriately narrowed 
contexts of inquiry. Typically, question-
driven or exploratory work is required to 
generate the detailed understanding and 
background knowledge associated with 
such contexts. Most scientific inquiry 
will, therefore, consist of a range of 
investigative modes, including hypoth-
esis testing, in repeated interplay with 
one another. This iterative interaction is 
arguably the engine of science and the 
characteristic that marks it as a special 
form of human inquiry.
Funding Agency Guidelines
Biologists may not need sophisticated 
philosophical accounts of the con-
nections between these practices 
in order to do science successfully. 
But it is important to understand how 
these modes of investigation and their 
dynamic relationships are reflected in 
the philosophies of scientific practice 
that guide funding agencies (Wilkins, 
2001). Frank Gannon recently published 
a parody of peer review in which two 
referees urge rejection of a fictional 
funding application by Charles Darwin. 
They criticize the proposed research for 
lacking an analysis of societal impact 
and also express concern about “the 
lack of a clear hypothesis to guide the 
enormous research task you propose: 
you could end up wasting your time and 
our money in an open-ended fishing 
exercise” (Gannon, 2009).
Amusing as it is to think of Darwin 
being turned down for the research pro-
gram that underpinned his development 
of the principle of natural selection, it 
is worth reflecting on the fact that the 
criteria currently used by funding agen-
cies would likely require rejection of a 
contemporary (molecular) equivalent of 
his proposal due to its exploratory and 
discovery-driven nature.r Inc.Although numerous funding agencies 
offer publicly funded support to life sci-
ences research, we have focused on two 
US bodies, the NIH and NSF, and one 
UK research council, the BBSRC. These 
choices of agency allow us to make a 
rough comparative evaluation of philos-
ophies of funding, not just cross-nation-
ally but also between agencies with 
different research briefs, ranging from 
more strictly biological (BBSRC), to life 
sciences in general including biomedi-
cal investigation and clinical applica-
tions (NIH), to an even broader mélange 
of disciplines and themes, reaching well 
beyond biology (NSF).
The NIH offers very clear statements 
about what hypothesis testing is and why 
it is so central to research and the evalua-
tion of funding applications (http://grants.
nih.gov/grants/writing_application.htm). 
In its general advice to applicants on 
writing standard grant proposals, the 
agency tells inexperienced applicants 
that “A strong grant application is driven 
by a strong, solid hypothesis with clear 
research objectives. The specific aims 
are a formal statement of the objectives 
and milestones of the research project 
towards testing the hypothesis.… At its 
core, the typical, successful R01 grant 
application has a testable hypothesis in 
an area of high interest.” 
These sentiments are expressed even 
more directly by the National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Disease, in the 
section entitled, “Create a solid hypoth-
esis.” There, the agency instructs appli-
cants to construct the entire proposal 
around a seemingly simple hypothesis 
(http://www.niaid.nih.gov/ncn/grants/
cycle/part02.htm#e). “Most top-notch 
NIH grant applications are driven by 
strong hypotheses. Generally applica-
tions should ask questions that prove or 
disprove a hypothesis rather than search 
for a problem or simply collect informa-
tion. Think of your hypothesis as the 
foundation of your application—the con-
ceptual underpinning on which the entire 
structure rests. Your experimental results 
will prove or disprove your hypothesis.”
The situation, however, is more 
nuanced than these bald statements 
might indicate. To some degree, the NIH 
also recognizes the value of exploratory 
research. Its Exploratory/Developmental 
Research Program (R21) features a dif-
ferent application mechanism, providing 
a broader means by which problems of 
biological knowledge or clinical practice 
can be addressed. Emphasis is placed on 
novelty, discovery, and innovativeness: 
“The evolution and vitality of the biomedi-
cal sciences require a constant infusion 
of new ideas, techniques, and points of 
view. These may differ substantially from 
current thinking or practice and may not 
yet be supported by substantial prelimi-
nary data” (http://grants.nih.gov/grants/
guide/pa-files/PA-06-181.html#PartII). 
The NIH supports various forms of inno-
vative research through a range of “Fund-
ing Opportunities,” some announced very 
recently (e.g., http://grants.nih.gov/grants/
guide/rfa-files/RFA-OD-09-004.html). 
Thus, the NIH review criteria do not iden-
tify strict hypothesis testing as necessary 
or desirable for all types of funding.
The NSF follows a similar strategy. 
Hypothesis testing is taken as the norm, 
the prescribed mode of scientific prac-
tice: “Hypothesis testing: The standard 
model of the classical approach to sci-
entific research in which a hypothesis is 
formulated before the experiment to test 
its truth” (Glossary in http://www.nsf.
gov/pubs/2002/nsf02057/). But despite 
subscribing to this philosophy of sci-
ence, NSF review guidelines do not men-
tion hypotheses. Reviewers are merely 
instructed to assess proposals for “intel-
lectual merit” and “broader impact” 
(https://www.fastlane.nsf.gov/NSFHelp/
f lashhelp/fastlane/FastLane_Help/ 
fastlane_help.htm#welcome_to_the_
fastlane_help_system.htm; scroll down 
to Proposal Review). The NSF also offers 
funding for exploratory research, previ-
ously under the banner of “Small Grants 
for Exploratory Research” (SGER), and 
now renamed “EArly-concept Grants for 
Exploratory Research,” with the appeal-
ing acronym of “EAGER” (http://www.
nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappguide/
nsf08_1/gpg_2.jsp#IID1). EAGER and 
SGER are mechanisms to fund “prelimi-
nary work on untested and novel ideas” 
and are designed as supplements to 
standard research routes (http://www.
nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_
id = 501093).
The BBSRC is the primary patron of 
life science research in the UK. It takes 
a less prescriptive view of how research 
should be done but is more directive than the NIH and NSF about the fram-
ing of research questions, requiring that 
they be asked within particular fields of 
inquiry (e.g., systems biology, synthetic 
biology, aging research). Only very occa-
sionally is hypothesis-driven research 
mentioned as the norm of scientific 
practice. The principal example we have 
found is in a mock referee’s report that 
accompanies the guidelines for referees. 
In the section on “Scientific excellence,” 
referees are requested to comment on 
the “clarity of hypotheses or aims and 
objectives” in relation to the strengths 
and weaknesses of the experimental 
design (http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/funding/
referees/referee_report_example.pdf). 
The referee guidelines themselves, how-
ever, do not specify the need for clear 
hypotheses. In part, this open approach 
to practice may be because of the 
BBSRC’s present emphasis on systems 
biology. The systems biology section of 
the webpage devoted to “Our science” 
represents the agency’s conceptualiza-
tion of scientific practice as one of itera-
tivity between hypothesis generation and 
testing (http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/ science/
systems_approach.html).
Evaluating Funding Agency 
 Philosophies
Although it is encouraging to see 
increasing recognition of broader strate-
gies in research practice, there are sev-
eral ways in which the structure of these 
funding programs does not adequately 
reflect the scientific importance and 
pervasiveness of non-hypothesis-driven 
modes of investigation. First, the NIH’s 
R21 program defines “exploratory” proj-
ects as those that “assess the feasibil-
ity of a novel area of investigation or a 
new experimental system” or that could 
lead to the development of “novel tech-
niques, agents, methodologies, models 
or applications.” The other innovative 
award programs are even more explicit 
about focusing on new approaches or 
“out-of-the-box” ideas. The problem 
with these definitions is that they treat 
broader non-hypothesis-driven activities 
as preliminary, rather than as profoundly 
important for ongoing scientific activity. 
By separating exploratory grants from 
standard ones and limiting them to the 
early stages of research, this funding 
policy may hamper researchers from Cell 13moving back and forth between differ-
ent approaches in advanced research 
projects. A further limitation is that the 
funding for R21 awards is capped at 
$275,000 over a 2 year period, whereas 
standard hypothesis-driven R01 awards 
are not limited and can cover a 5 year 
time frame.
At the NSF, the same assumption that 
exploratory work is preliminary, rather 
than encompassing or interwoven with 
hypothesis-driven research, pervades 
the SGER and EAGER guidelines. Non-
EAGER research is, in fact, described as 
“regular” research. Moreover, as in the 
case of the NIH, the funding for these 
awards is limited. In the first 4 weeks of 
2009, for example, SGER Awards consti-
tuted just 16 out of 555 total NSF awards. 
Of the approximately 2000 SGER grants 
awarded between 1995 and 2008, only 
about 20% went to projects of a biological 
nature (http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/). 
Furthermore, a 2005 NSF Background 
Paper discusses numerous limitations of 
current programs for funding transforma-
tive, innovative, and exploratory research. 
Among the serious obstacles to the suc-
cess of such funding programs, it specifi-
cally identifies poor definitions of this cat-
egory of research, the inability to measure 
innovation and the success of exploratory 
investigations, and the conservatism of 
reviewers, especially when such programs 
are multidisciplinary (http://www.nsf.gov/
nsb/committees/archive/tr/2005_08_
bkgd_paper.pdf).
As already noted, the BBSRC does 
not explicitly separate hypothesis-driven 
research from broader approaches. 
What is emphasized is the interplay 
between hypothesis-generating and 
hypothesis-testing research strate-
gies, especially in the context of sys-
tems biology (http://blogs.bbsrc.ac.uk/
index.php/tag/bbsrc/; http://www.bbsrc.
ac.uk/science/ systems_approach.html). 
Although a range of practices appear 
to be implicit in this account, they are 
conceptually subordinated to devising, 
testing, and confirming hypotheses and 
models. In fact, the primary scientific 
output of any such hypothesis-focused 
schema would be hypotheses and mod-
els in and of themselves. We agree that 
hypothesis generation and testing are 
important to science at many points in a 
wider topography of inquiry but believe 8, August 21, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc. 613
Figure 1. How Science Works
This depiction of science emphasizes the iterativity, interactivity, and fluidity of the scientific process. At 
its core are activities that involve testing ideas with data. This core is connected to an encompassing 
matrix of exploration and discovery, community analysis and feedback, and benefits and outcomes. All 
three outer processes feed into and receive feedback from the core process of testing ideas.
Modified from Understanding Science, University of California Museum of Paleontology (http://undsci.
berkeley.edu/flowchart_noninteractive.php).that any practical philosophy of science 
has to recognize an overarching aim of 
producing understanding and effec-
tively intervening in the world. The ways 
in which that aim is realized need to be 
decided pragmatically, not through ide-
alizations about hypotheses, which too 
easily become overly simplistic prox-
ies for good science and questionable 
means for identifying bad science.
A Broader Account of Scientific 
Practice
Is there a better representation of sci-
entific processes available? An alterna-
tive is the four-sphere dynamic (Figure 614 Cell 138, August 21, 2009 ©2009 Elsevie1), produced with NSF funding by the 
“Understanding Science” project at the 
Museum of Paleontology, University of 
California at Berkeley, in collaboration 
with a diverse group of scientists and 
teachers.
Described by one commentator as 
“a dynamic alternative to the scientific 
method” (http://www.aibs.org/eye-on-
education/eye_on_education_2009_01.
html), the figure sets out a range of 
activities, aims, inputs, and outputs that 
include exploration, data gathering and 
analysis, hypothesis testing and revision, 
technology development, and commu-
nity scrutiny. This four-sphere scheme r Inc.is a valuable correction of a narrow and 
exclusive representation of science as 
linear hypothesis testing, but we think 
it still does not capture sufficiently the 
deep and pervasive interplay between 
the distinct methodologies that con-
stitute scientific inquiry. For example, 
exploration is placed primarily at the start 
of the scientific process and technologi-
cal development at the end. We suggest 
instead that exploratory and technology-
oriented research flow through all the 
other spheres of the diagram and enter 
iteratively into the core activities that are 
labeled in the diagram as “testing ideas.” 
Although the authors of the diagram aim 
to overcome standard representations 
of hypothesis-driven science, the labels 
of these spheres—despite the two-way 
arrows between them and the other 
spheres—still fail to capture effectively 
the recurrence of exploratory, question-
driven, and technology-oriented scien-
tific investigation at every phase of sci-
entific work.
A more complete picture of scientific 
activities (visual or verbal) would require 
a thorough investigation of the roles of 
different strategies in the overall practice 
of science. One approach that may help 
accomplish this is to examine key activi-
ties that characterize particular research 
contexts. These contexts are shaped 
by the background ontology of various 
disciplines (which may offer differing 
accounts of the nature of the phenom-
ena and of underlying entities thought to 
explain those phenomena), claims about 
the reliability of available technology 
and modeling practices, the procedural 
assumptions of different disciplines 
(e.g., views about what constitutes suf-
ficient and reliable evidence), and the 
culture of the scientific community. 
More open approaches thrive especially 
(but not exclusively) in a broad context 
of inquiry, where the precise nature of 
the phenomena is partially known but 
still contested, the instrumentation is 
developing in several directions, and the 
background knowledge is multiperspec-
tival and multidisciplinary. The narrow-
ing of such contextual information, so 
that a tightly focused hypothesis can be 
tested, occurs only in specific situations, 
often as a product of mono-disciplinary 
lines of investigation, and is likely to be 
centered in a short phase of inquiry.
For example, at first, molecular biol-
ogy maintained a semblance of following 
the hypothesis-driven model. But when 
thousands of molecules involved in vast 
networks of activity are being studied, as 
they are in systems biology, a straight-
forward hypothesis-driven approach is 
insufficient to elucidate how major find-
ings are made (Brent, 2000; Franklin, 
2005). Linear modes of inquiry that nar-
row the research question so that it can 
produce a yes/no or true/false answer 
are then unlikely to capture the phenom-
ena or characterize scientific practice 
adequately. The four-sphere diagram 
clearly recognizes this, but by retain-
ing the notion of “testing ideas” as the 
core of the scientific process, it is likely 
to perpetuate a narrower view of science 
than is realistic.
We are certainly not advocating that all 
approaches and methodologies should 
be seen as equal. Scientific activity is, 
in part, the process of sorting out which 
approaches and accounts are valuable 
and which ones offer insufficient or mis-
guided understanding. These judgments 
are contextually limited, but context, as 
we have argued, is most often multidi-
mensional. We do think that no single 
scientific method applies in all cases, 
and that it is an open question as to 
which modes of investigation work best 
under particular circumstances.Conclusions
Better representations of how science 
works will be useful for the public under-
standing of science, scientists’ concep-
tion of science, and the appreciation 
by funding agencies of good science. 
Developing a multidimensional account 
of scientific inquiry that does justice to 
a broader conception of investigative 
strategies and their interplay is not the 
task of a few people with metascientific 
interests, but one that properly belongs 
to the communities it will affect. Recent 
molecular biology research showcases 
the difficulty of confining investigations 
to the contexts set by a single disci-
pline or to one category of investigative 
tools. Even without a full picture of how 
science works in such complex set-
tings, we suggest that more attention 
to the interplay between activities that 
include exploration, question-driven 
inquiry, and technology development, 
as well as hypothesis-driven investiga-
tion, will improve funding agency guide-
lines, expectations, and the norms of 
practice that they are enforcing and 
reinforcing.
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